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CASENOTES
Limiting Exclusion of Evidence Under the Federal Courts' Supervisory
Power with a Fourth Amendment Sword: United States v. Paynerl —
Throughout the past two decades the Supreme Court of the United States has
conducted an extensive re-evaluation of the exclusionary rule — the rule that
excludes illegally obtained materials from admission into evidence in subse,
quent legal proceedings . 2
 This process has narrowed the scope of the rule's
application . 3 At the present time, a third party whose own privacy rights are not
violated by an illegally conducted search which intrudes upon the constitutional
rights of another lacks standing to challenge the search under the fourth amend-
ment.* Recently, in United States v. Payner, 5 the Supreme Court further narrowed
the scope of the exclusionary rule by refusing to extend its benefits to such a third
party under the federal court's supervisory power, a non-constitutional device of
the federal judiciary designed to preserve a fair and orderly administration of
justice.° The Court's ruling prompted Justice Marshall to claim in dissent that
the majority had improperly encumbered the supervisory power with fourth
amendment standing restrictions.' By so doing, he reasoned, the Court had
allowed fourth amendment standing to become a sword that the Government
may wield, as it did in Payner, to deliberately violate the constitutional rights of
one person in order to gather evidence against another who will be incapable of
invoking the exclusionary rule.°
In Payner, the federal government's prosecution of Jack Payner resulted
from a criminal investigation conducted by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS),
entitled "Operation Tradewinds ." 9 The operation, initiated in 1965, was aimed
at identifying Americans who were maintaining unreported accounts in
Bahamian banks.'° In 1972, suspicion focused on the Castle Bank and Trust
Company of the Bahamas (Castle Bank)." The IRS agent supervising the
operation approached one Norman Casper, a private investigator in Miami,
Florida and occasional government informant, to solicit his cooperation in the
investigation of the Castle Bank. 12 Casper, who was acquainted with Michael
' 100 S. Ct. 2439 (1980).
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
See, e.g., McMillian, Is There Anything Left of the Fourth Amendment, 24 ST. LOUIS L.J. 1,
2-3 (1979).
4 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138 (1978); Alterman v. United States, 394 U.S.
165, 171-72 (1969).
5 100 S. Ct. 2439 (1980).
See text and notes at notes 129-81 infra.
United States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. at 2447-48 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
8 Id.
9 Id. at 2443.
J° Id. A taxpayer Wing Form 1040 must also indicate on Schedule B whether or not s/he
had any interest in a foreign account. If so, Treasury Form 90-22.1 must also be filed. [19811
STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 1 5008.0177.
" United States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. at 2443.
12 id .
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Wolstencroft, a Castle Bank vice-president, agreed to participate.' 3
 Casper's
involvement included introducing Wolstencroft to Sybol Kennedy, a private
investigator and former employee of Casper."
In early 1973, Casper learned that Wolstencroft planned to visit Miami on
January 15.' 5
 Casper knew Wolstencroft would carry a briefcase containing
records .about the bank's depositors.' 6
 Casper then devised a scheme for the
illegal search of Wolstencroft's briefcase.L 7
 He arranged for Wolstencroft to go to
dinner with Kennedy while leaving the briefcase in her apartment.' 8
 Using a key
supplied by Kennedy, Casper entered the apartment and removed the briefcase
to a nearby location where he met a locksmith referred to him by the IRS.° The
locksmith made a key to fit the briefcase." Casper delivered the briefcase to IRS
agents who employed a photography expert to copy the over four-hundred
documents containing therein." Materials obtained from Wolstencroft's brief-
case enabled IRS investigators to discover that Jack Payner maintained an un-
reported account at the Castle Bank. 22
Payner's failure to report this account on his income tax return for 1972
resulted in his indictment for falsifying that return." The district court con-
solidated the hearing on Payner's motion to suppress with the trial on the
merits, 2 ' and ordered that the evidence obtained as a result of the illegal search
of Wolstencroft's briefcase be suppressed. 25
 Accordingly, it found Payner not
guilty. 26
In excluding this evidence, the district court applied a balancing test, used
to determine when the exclusionary rule should be invoked, which weighs the
deterrent impact of applying the rule against the harm society suffers by the
exclusion of reliable and probative evidence. 27
 In applying this test, the court
Id.
" Casper was paid eight thousand dollars by the IRS for his participation in Operation
Tradewinds. Id. at 2449 (Marshall, J. dissenting). He, in turn, paid one thousand dollars to
Kennedy for her participation. Id.
' 5 Id. at 2443.
Id.
' 7 Id.
15 See id. at 2449 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
' 9 Id.
20 Id.
2 ' Id. at 2443.
22 See id. at 2442-43.
29
 Id. at 2442. A knowing and willful false statement or misrepresentation made to the
government "in any matter within the jurisdiction of the United States" is a criminal act. 18
U.S.C. S 1001 (1976).
24
 United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 118 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
2' Id. at 136.
26 See United States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. at 2443 n.2.
27
 United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. at 124. The balancing test implemented by the
district court was derived from United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976). Janis was a civil
assessment action filed by the IRS for wagering excise taxes. Id. at 437. The evidence supporting
the Government's case had been illegally seized by state law enforcement officers acting under a
defective warrant and previously had been suppressed in state criminal proceedings. Id. at 437-38.
The Janis Court, in its decision on whether to apply the exclusionary rule, balanced "the likeli-
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examined the nature of the Government's conduct. The district court found as
fact" that the Government was a full partner in the search conducted by Casper,
having "knowingly and willfully participated in the unlawful seizure" of
Wolstencroft's briefcase." The search not only violated Wolstencroft's constitu-
tional rights, it also involved outright violations of Florida criminal statutes. 3°
Further, the district court found that the IRS had "affirmatively counselled]"
its agents that illegally seized evidence would be admissible against third parties
because they could not challenge the search under the fourth amendment, 3 ' and
that in this case "the seizure was conducted in order to gain information about
depositors in the Castle Bank; it was not to gain information about Wolsten-
croft." 32 The district court characterized the Government's misconduct as
"outrageous"" in that it demonstrated "knowing and purposeful bad faith
hostility to [another] person's fundamental constitutional rights." 34 Because of
this outrageous conduct the court concluded that application of the exclusionary
rule was justified."
The district court did not base its application of the exclusionary rule on
fourth amendment grounds." The court realized that standing restrictions
barred Payner from invoking the fourth amendment, despite the outrageous
conduct of the government, because the search did not violate Payner's privacy
rights." In doing so, the court followed recent fourth amendment decisions of
the Supreme Court which have determined that the requisite deterrent impact of
imposing the rule to remedy a fourth amendment violation is not present where
the defendant's own fourth amendment rights were not violated.'" The district
court instead based its exclusion ruling on both the due process clause of the fifth
hood of deterring the conduct of the state police" against the societal costs imposed by
exclusion." Id. at 454. Finding the "additional marginal deterrence" of excluding the evidence in
the subsequent civil proceeding in another forum after its prior exclusion in the state criminal
court to be insufficient, the Court refused to apply the rule. Id. at 453-54.
28 See United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. at 118-23. The district court's findings of fact
were not disturbed by the Supreme Court. See 100 S. Ct. at 2443 & n.3.
29 United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. at 120-21.
" Id. at 130 n.66. At that time the Florida criminal larceny statute made it a
misdemeanor or felony to with intent unlawfully to deprive . . the true owner of his property"
or to take "from the possession of the true owner, or of any person . . . any property." FLA. STAT.
ANN. 812.021 (1)(a) (1976) (repealed).
" United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. at 132-33.
" Id. at 120 n.37. While it is true that Wolstencroft was indicted as a co-defendant, he
failed to answer the indictment. United States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. 2452 n.13 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). In fact, the IRS agent who directed the operation admitted at trial that the Govern-
ment had no interest in taking any action against Wolstencroft. United States v. Payner, 434 F.
Supp. at 120 n.37. The Supreme Court felt no need to challenge either this finding or the equally
critical finding on the Government's full participation. See United States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. at
2443 n.3.
" United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. at 130.
34
 Id. at 129 (emphasis in original).
" Id. at 129, 135.
36 Id. at 126.
" Id.
36 Id. (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969)).
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amendment39
 and the supervisory power." The court reasoned that in cases of
outrageous misconduct, the balance shifts to favor exclusion regardless of
whether the defendant's own fourth amendment rights were violated or not . 41
Due process and the supervisory power protect against such misconduct and -
provide for such vicarious exclusion. 42
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the decision of the district court." In a brief per curiam opinion, the
appeals court based its decision solely on the supervisory power, which it found
had been properly applied by the lower court."
In a six to three decision" the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals
decision, and HELD: illegally seized evidence may not be excluded under either
the supervisory power or the fourth amendment where the manner of obtaining
the evidence does not violate the privacy rights of the defendant." Justice
Powell, writing for the majority, noted that the district court had correctly ruled
that Payner lacked fourth amendment standing." The Court observed that each
application of the exclusionary rule exacts a toll on society by depriving the trier
of fact from receiving reliable and probative evidence." Therefore, use of the
rule must be restricted to situations where the policies underlying its existence
are best effectuated." These policies, as identified by the Court, are the
deterrence of future illegality and the preservation of judicial integrity. 50 The
majority placed greater emphasis on the former. 51 The Court maintained that to
39 Id. at 133. The relevant part of the amendment is: "[n]o person shall be .. . deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. .. ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The
district court based its ruling on Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), in which the Court
suppressed evidence obtained by methods found to be "shock[ing to] the conscience." Id. at 172.
The district court then went on to state its own standard for exclusion under due process in this
case: "This Court concludes that Due Process requires exclusion of reliable evidence only in those
cases in which government officials obtain the challenged materials in a grossly improper fashion,
i.e., by engaging in illegal conduct which exhibits their knowing and purposeful bad faith hostility to
any person's fundamental constitutional rights." United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. at 129
(emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
40 Id. at 134-35. The district court's standard for applying the supervisory power was sub-
stantially the same as that under due process: "[T]he federal courts' supervisory power should be
invoked to exclude evidence obtained by Governmental conduct which is either purposefully
illegal or motivated by an intentional bad faith hostility to a constitutional right." Id. (footnotes
omitted).
4' Id. at 129, 135.
42 Id.
43
 United States v. Payner, 590 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
44 Id. at 207.
45 The majority opinion was written by Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Stewart, White, Rehnquist, and Stevens. Chief Justice Burger also filed a concurring
opinion. Justice Marshall filed a dissent, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun.
46 United States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. at 2444, 2446.
" Id. at 2444.
" Id. at 2445.
49 Id.
" Id. at 2446 n.B.
" See id. at 2446 & n.8. The majority read the district court's opinion as relying primarily
on the deterrence rationale. Id. at n.8. The Court stated however, that the societal interests
favoring admissibility outweighed the benefits of exclusion under either rationale. Id. For a dis-
cussion of the policies underlying the exclusionary rule, see text and notes at notes 63-92 infra.
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suppress evidence to benefit a third party such as Payner would upset the careful
balance between the competing interests of deterring future illegality and
providing the trier of fact with reliable evidence that has been established in its
recent fourth amendment decisions." Thus, the fourth amendment could not
support application of the exclusionary rule in this case.
Continuing on these lines, the Court stated that "[t]he same societal
interests are at risk when a criminal defendant invokes the supervisory power to
suppress evidence seized in violation of a third party's constitutional rights.""
Hence, this balancing, which favors admission of the evidence in the third party
context, is not altered by a defendant's invocation of the supervisory power."
Further, the Court found the lower courts' use of the supervisory power to be
"standardless," in that it left too much to the discretion of a trial judge by
permitting this balance of interests to be ignored." Thus, the Court refused to
invoke the exclusionary rule here under the supervisory power.
Justice Marshall, in a dissent joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun,
was less interested in focusing on the rights of the particular defendant before the
Court than on placing primary emphasis on the level of government mis-
conduct. 56 He examined the policies behind the exclusionary rule and criticized
the majority for overemphasizing deterrence at the expense of judicial
integrity." Citing Justice Brandeis' famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States ,58
Justice Marshall stated that evidence obtained through the type of illegality
present in Payner could not be admitted into a court without tainting that court's
integrity." He also contended that the majority's analysis "engraft[ed]" fourth
amendment standing law onto the supervisory power. 6° According to Justice
Marshall, the Court's reasoning deprived the supervisory power of its vitality in
the search and seizure area by limiting use of the exclusionary rule to instances
where a privacy right of the defendant has been violated."
Payner presents another example of the Supreme Court narrowing the scope
of the exclusionary rule. The Court's emphasis on the policy of deterring future
misconduct greatly outweighed its consideration of the policy of protecting
judicial integrity. This misplaced emphasis caused the Payner Court to refrain
52 100 S. Ct. at 2445. See Rakas v. United States, 439 U.S. 128, 138-39, 143 (1978);
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1969).
53 100 S. Ct. at 2446.
" Id. at 2446-47.
" Id. at 2445, 2447. Chief Justice Burger filed a brief concurrence in which he agreed that
Payner could not take advantage of the violations of Wolstencroft's rights. Id. at 2447 (Burger,
C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice also stated that separation of powers considerations pre-
cluded the supervisory power from being used, outside the judicial sphere, as a general oversight
device to police the affairs of the executive branch. Id. For a discussion of the limits on the
supervisory power in this regard, see text and notes at notes 161-63 infra.
56 100 S. Ct, at 2447-54 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 2451-53.
'° 277 U.S. 438, 471-85 (1928).
59 100 S. Ct. at 2451-52. Justice Marshall stated that a court's reception of evidence
which is "the intended product of deliberately illegal government action" places an "imprimatur
upon such lawlessness and thereby taints its own authority." Id. at 2452.
66 Id. at 2453.
61 Id.
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from examining whether suppression of evidence obtained from egregious gov-
ernmental misconduct was warranted in order to protect the integrity of the
Federal Courts and the administration of criminal justice therein . 62
 This focus
sanctions activities that taint that integrity by precluding exclusion to benefit
third parties under the supervisory power regardless of the amount of the gov-
ernment's wrongdoing.
This casenote will argue that such a result is unnecessary, even within the
context of a more limited exclusionary rule. It will be shown that even where the
defendant's rights are not violated, courts should be permitted to rely on the
supervisory power to exclude evidence seized by grossly improper means. This
article will begin with an examination of the policy justifications — the deter-
rence of future illegality and the preservation of judicial integrity — which
underlie the exclusionary rule. It then will discuss the reasons why the constitu-
tional grounds for applying the rule — the fourth amendment and the due
process clause of the fifth amendment — are inadequate bases for invoking the
rule to benefit a third party whose own rights were not violated by an illegal
search. Next, the supervisory power will be examined, with respect to both its
nature and its adaptability as a device for vicarious exclusion. Further, a
standard for third party exclusion in prosecutions in the federal courts will be
proposed. Finally, the effectiveness of this standard will be scrutinized in light of
the policies underlying the rule.
I. THE POLICIES BEHIND THE EXISTENCE OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
In deciding to deny application of the exclusionary rule to benefit a third
party under the supervisory power, the Supreme Court in Payner purported to
implement the policies that underlie the rule." Before examining the nature of
the supervisory power and its application to illegal searches and seizures, it is
first necessary to understand these basic supporting rationales. The
exclusionary rule frequently has been termed a "judicially created" device,
indicating that it exists as an engraftment upon fourth amendment search and
seizure law to effectuate its policies." HenCe, because its continued existence is
not constitutionally mandated, it is continually open to judicial re-evaluation.
As will be shown, the policies that the Court emphasizes will greatly influence a
decision to expand or contract the rule . 65
 During the Court's re-evaluation of the
" See text and notes at notes 71.80 infra.
63
 See text and notes at notes 49-52 supra.
64 See, e.g. , Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
65
 The Supreme Court's opinion in Payner illustrates this process. By emphasizing the
deterrence rationale and the balancing test conducted under it instead of judicial integrity, the
Court focused on the reliability of the evidence and the harm to society suffered when such
evidence is excluded rather than upon how it was obtained. Thus, the Court did not inquire
whether the admission of such evidence tainted the integrity of the courts. This focus on the harm
suffered by exclusion facilitates the admission of such evidence. See 100 S. Ct. at 2445-46 & text
and notes at notes 49-54 supra. See also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 127, 137-38 (1978); Alderman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969).
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rule in the past two decades, the Court's emphasis in this area has shifted. This
shift has contributed to the current inability of third parties to invoke the exclu-
sionary rule.
The district court in Payner perceived a two-fold rationale behind the exclu-
sionary rule: (1) the deterrence of future governmental misconduct, and (2) the
preservation of judicial integrity." The first rationale, as applied, focuses on the
truth-seeking function of the court by asking whether the deterrence gained by
exclusion outweighs the harm suffered by depriving the trier of fact of reliable
evidence." The second rationale involves the notion that the administration of
justice must remain untainted. In this light, the need for evidence must be sub-
ordinated to the requirement that the government abide by its own laws while
imposing them on its citizens." Prior to the Court's re-evaluation of the rule,
this latter policy was recognized as a separate and distinct justification for the
exclusion of evidence. Indeed, in Weeks v. United States," the case which intro-
duced the exclusionary rule as a device for suppressing evidence seized in viola-
tion of-the fourth amendment, the Court stressed the importance of preserving
judicial integrity as a basis for the rule's creation and use. 7°
The most articulate expressions of this underlying justification for the
exclusionary rule are contained in the famous dissents in Olmstead v. United
States." In that decision, the majority held that the rule would not be applied to
exclude evidence obtained through illegal wiretaps where there had been no
violation of the defendant's proprietary interests." In his sharp criticism of this
result, Justice Brandeis wrote that evidence obtained illegally must be excluded
"in order to preserve the judicial process from contamination."" He reasoned
that because the government acts as "the omni-present teacher," its use of
66 United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. at 123-24.
67 This is the Janis balancing test which the district court applied in its analysis of when
the exclusionary rule is to be invoked. See note 27 supra.
68 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U,S. 643, 659 (1961); Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 470, 485 (1928) (Holmes, J., & Brandeis, J., dissenting); J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 85 (1976); cf. Uviller, The Advocate, the Truth, and Judicial
Hackles: A Reaction to Judge Frankel's Idea, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1078 (1975) (lawyer's duty as
advocate for the client versus duty to the truth seeking function of the courts). The Olmstead
dissents are discussed at text and notes at notes 71-75 infra.
69 See 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The defendant in Weeks was convicted of illegal gambling
operations. Id. at 386. The evidence against the defendant, personal papers taken from his
quarters, was seized without a warrant. Id. Reasoning that an exclusionary rule was necessary in
order to implement the guarantees of the fourth amendment, the Court stated:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held against a citizen accused of
an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure
against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are con-
cerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution.
Id. at 393.
'° Id. at 392, 394.
" 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
72 Id. at 464-65. Olmstead was overruled by the Supreme Court in Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967).
75 277 U.S. at 484 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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illegal practices to gather evidence can have disasterous effects on a nation
pledged to the rule of law. 24 He continued:
Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it
breeds contempt for the law; it invites every man to become a law unto
himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the
criminal law the end justifies the means — to declare that the Govern-
ment may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private
criminal — would bring terrible retribution."
Thus, in Justice Brandeis' opinion, the government calls its own validity into
question when it indulges in lawbreaking to convict its lawbreakers. To protect
their own integrity, courts must not aid in this process.
This rationale was adopted by the Supreme Court in several subsequent
decisions in which illegally seized evidence was excluded." For example, in
Mapp u. Ohio," the Court extended the exclusionary rule to the States through
the operation of the fourteenth amendment." Responding to Justice Cardozo's
famous lament that "Nile criminal is to go free because the constable has
blundered," the Mapp Court observed that "[tike criminal goes free, if he
must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government
more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of
the charter of its own existence.""
While the most recent decisions, including Payner, have continued to pay at
least lip service to the independent validity of the judicial integrity rationale, 8 '
the bulk of the decisions of the past decade have looked primarily, if not exclu-
sively, toward the deterrence rationale as the only legitimate justification for
invoking the exclusionary rule. 82 This trend led at least one commentator to
conclude that the Supreme Court had extinguished the judicial integrity
74 Id. at 485.
" Id. Although less frequently quoted, similar sentiments were expressed by Justice
Holmes, who stated in part:
[W]e must consider the two objects of desire, both of which we can not have, and make
up our minds which to choose. It is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to
that end all available evidence should be used. It also is desirable that the Government
should not itself foster and pay for other crimes, when they are the means by which
evidence is to be obtained. . . . We have to choose, and for my part I think it is a less evil
that some criminals should escape than that the Government should play an ignoble
part.
Id. at 470. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
76 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659-60 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 222-23 (1960); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340-41, 343 (1943).
" 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
78 Id. at 655. The defendant in Mapp was convicted of possession of pornographic
materials. Id. at 643. The evidence was obtained through an illegal search aimed at finding a
suspect in a bombing and at discovering gambling paraphernalia. Id. at 644-45. The pornographic
materials were uncovered in the course of this search. Id. at 645. The Court ruled that this
evidence must be excluded. Id. at 655.
" People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
8° Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 659.
" See United States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. at 2446 n. B. See also Dunaway v. New York, 442
U.S. 200, 217-18 (1979) (referring to the "two policies behind the use of the exclusionary rule").
" See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458 n.35 (1976); Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 484-85 (1976); See generally Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
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rationale as an independent ground for applying the rule." In this same period,
attacks upon the rule cited empirical research which challenged the deterrent
impact of the rule's use." Although no conclusive data on the subject have ever
been compiled, this early research indicated that the exclusionary rule's impact
on the deterrence of future illegality was minimal or non-existent,' thus increas-
ing the pressure to limit the rule. More recent research has revealed that such
conclusions were premature at best and has produced more positive indications
of the rule's deterrent impact." Yet the pressures to limit the rule have not
abated.
By focusing on deterrence rather than judicial integrity, the courts are
much more likely to deny application of the rule. The balancing test utilized
under the deterrence rationale weighs the benefits to society in deterring future
illegalities against the harm incurred by allowing a guilty person to go free."
Such a test inherently favors the admission of illegally obtained evidence
83 See Comment, Judicial Integrity for the Exclusionary Rule Rejected: United States v. Janis,
1977 WASH. U. L.Q. 129, 138 [hereinafter cited as Comment, United States v. Janis]. The
commentator based his opinion on United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976). The Janis case is
discussed at note 27 supra. The Janis Court stated: "The focus therefore must be on the question
whether the admission of the evidence encourages violations of Fourth Amendment rights. As the
Court has noted in recent cases, this inquiry is essentially the same as the inquiry into whether
exclusion would serve a deterrent purpose." 428 U.S. 433, 459 n.35. Similar sentiments were
expressed in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976): "While courts, of course, must ever be
concerned with preserving the integrity of the judicial process, this concern has limited force as a
justification for the exclusion of highly probative evidence." Id. at 486 (1976). See also Bivens v. Six
Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 415 (1971) (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
84 United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 281 n.1 (1978) (Burger, C. J., concurring);
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 415 (1971) (Burger, C. J.,
dissenting).
83 See Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665,
678-709 (1970). Even if it could be established, however, that the exclusionary rule does not have
the desired deterrent effect in the more mainstream areas of police activities, the deterrent impact
on bad faith police misconduct would remain most effective. See text and notes at notes 230-32
infra. Hence, even if the exclusionary rule were to be restricted or eliminated in situations
involving routine police activity, its deterrent effect against the type of misconduct present in
Payner would justify its retention to exclude evidence so obtained. Cf. United States v. Peltier, 422
U.S. 531, 537-39, 542 (1975) (majority's reliance, in part, on a good faith versus bad faith test in
its decision not to exclude evidence seized by border patrol officers who believed their actions were
proper). See also Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), in
which he argued that the government's burden to show that evidence obtained subsequent to the
occurrence of an illegal search was not a product of that illegality should be much greater in cases
of bad faith misconduct than it should in cases of "technical" violations. Id. at 610-12 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part).
86 Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some New Data and a Plea Against a
Precipitous Conclusion, 62 KY. L. J. 681 (1974). Professor Canon writes:
[These more recent findings] cast considerable doubt on earlier conclusions that the rule
is ineffective in deterring illegal police searches. To be sure, such an assertion may have
been appropriate at one time, and as some of our evidence suggests, there are still
circumstances in which the rule has minimal impact on police behavior. But these cir-
cumstances are comparatively few. Most of our data do not permit such an inference.
Indeed, a good many of the findings support a positive inference — that the rule goes far
toward fulfilling its purpose.
Id. at 725-26.
" See Comment, United States v. Janis, supra note 83 at 137.
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because the deterrence effect is immeasurable. 88 For example, the choice
presented by a motion to exclude an illegally seized murder weapon presents a
balance between the abstract benefits of preventing such seizures in the future
and the immediate and tangible costs of setting the murderer free. The tendency
to sacrifice future benefits of an unknown quantity to prevent a present and
visible loss can make the test outcome determinative." Thus, principal reliance
on the policy of deterrence instead of judicial integrity makes it easier to reach
results such as the Payner decision."
The choice to de-emphasize the judicial integrity rationale, much like the
choice to further limit or eliminate the exclusionary rule itself, fundamentally
rests on a judgment regarding the effect that tainted evidence will have upon
being admitted into courts of law. The present Court seems unconcerned with
the effect that tainted evidence will have on the integrity of the courts. 9 ' Those
who are more concerned, however, with the harm which may be inflicted by the
admission of such evidence will be more desirous of retaining the rationale and
the exclusionary rule itself."
In summary, there are still two separate policies — the deterrence of future
illegality and the preservation of judicial integrity — which support the exist-
ence of the exclusionary rule. In the past two decades, however, the Supreme
Court has restricted the application and questioned the validity of the second
rationale. This emphasis on deterrence at the expense of judicial integrity has •
facilitated the narrowing of the rule which has occurred in this period.
II. THE INADEQUACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES
TO AID THIRD PARTIES
A. Rejection of Target Standing under the Fourth Amendment
By focusing on the deterrence rationale as the justification for the exclu-
sionary rule, the Supreme Court has in recent years cut back on the rule's




 It is perhaps worth noting that if the rule is to have its desired deterrent effect, law
enforcement officers must have workable standards to guide their conduct in the field. See Simons,
California's Rule of Vicarious Exclusion: Who May Challenge the Constable's Error?, 19 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 319, 324, 327-28 (1979). In this light, the dilution of the rule in recent years may produce a
climate of uncertainty in the minds of the police who may begin to feel that the Supreme Court will
be unwilling to order the suppression of evidence obtained illegally. This process may make
ineffective deterrence a self-fulfilling prophecy. Id. at 324-28. The commentator writes:
(T]here seems to be good reason to question the extent to which fourth amendment
rights exist independent of the exclusionary rule. . . [Jjudicial failure to punish mis-
conduct by exclusion is viewed by the police as a sanction of their behavior. Therefore, a
standing limitation seems likely to increase police disregard of the rights of those who are
searched in order to find evidence that can also be used against a third person.
Id. at 325-26. (footnote omitted).
] Set Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976).
92 The de-emphasis of judicial integrity also restrains the ability of the Court to limit the
exclusionary rule to cases of bad faith misconduct. Comment, Janis u. United States, supra note 83,
at 139. The Court has indicated that such a restriction of the exclusionary rule may be proper. See
note 85 supra.
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standing principles under the fourth amendment. Although it is now clear that
these restrictions preclude vicarious application of the rule under the fourth
amendment, such a limitation was less certain two decades ago. It was then that
the Supreme Court moved beyond the proprietary interest test of Olmstead v.
United States," under which one was required to demonstrate a violation of such
an interest in order to invoke the rule." The Court, intones v. United States , 95 laid
a foundation for a potentially broad reading of fourth amendment standing
through dictum defining the victim possessing standing to challenge an illegal
search as "one against whom the search was directed." 96 Subsequent cases
refined this notion to include persons having a privacy expectation in the area
that was searched." In the past decade, the Court has combined this notion of
standing based on privacy expectations with the emphasis on deterrence as the
primary justification for the exclusionary rule. The net result has been to deny
fourth amendment standing to third persons — persons whose expectations of
privacy were not violated by the illegal acts." Under this approach, the Court
has concluded that the incremental increase in deterrence which would result
93 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
94 See text at note 61 supra.
93 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
96 Id. at 261. This broadening occurred in order to note a person who lacked a genuine
proprietary interest in the place which was searched. The petitioner in Jones was convicted on
narcotics charges. Id. at 258. He had been arrested pursuant to a search of the apartment where he
had been staying. Id. at 258-59. The district court denied his motion to suppress on standing
grounds because he failed to allege a proprietary interest in either the apartment or the narcotics
that were seized. Id. at 259. In reversing this decision, the Supreme Court enunciated the
"legitimately on the premises" standard: "[A]nyone legitimately on the premises where a search
occurs may challenge its legality by way of a motion to suppress. . . ." Id. at 267. The Court
inquired into whether a person's presence was such that he or she might "invoke the privacy of the
premises searched." Id.
Jones also enunciated a second principle, known as "automatic standing" which granted
standing to persons in situations where possession of the contraband was, as in Janes, an essential
element of the charge. See id. at 263-64. This portion of Jones was superceded in Simmons v. United
States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), which held that testimony necessary at a suppression hearing to
demonstrate a possessory interest in the contraband would be inadmissible at trial regardless of the
ruling made on the motion to suppress. Id. at 394. See also Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223,
227-28 (1973).
97 In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) the Court ruled in favor of suppressing
phone conversations obtained by illegal wiretaps of a public phone. Stating that the fourth
amendment "protects people, not places," the Court held that what a person seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Id. at 351-52.
In Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968), the Court held that a union official had privacy
rights protected by the fourth amendment in open office space shared with other union officials. Id.
at 368-69. The Court stated:
In . . . a "private" office, DeForte would have been entitled to expect that he would not
be disturbed except by personal or business invitees. . . . It seems to us that the situation
was not fundamentally changed because DeForte shared an office with other union
officers. . . This expectation was inevitably defeated by the entrance of state officials.
Id. at 369.
98 See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969). In Alderman, convictions were
obtained in part because of evidence obtained through illegal electronic surveillance. The Court
rejected any ability on the part of those petitioners whose privacy interests were not violated to
assert "an independent constitutional right of their own to exclude relevant and probative
evidence because it was seized from another in violation of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 174.
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from extending the rule to benefit third parties would be insufficient to offset the
harm inflicted upon society by such an extension. 99
 This marginal deterrence
analysis seeks to restrict the exclusionary rule to "those areas where its remedial
objectives are most efficaciously served. loo
The clearest statement of the fourth amendment's standing restrictions in
recent cases is found in Rakas v. Illinois . 1°' Rakas is the culmination of two
decades of fourth amendment standing law. The Rakas Court characterized the
issue of who may invoke the exclusionary rule as one of substantive fourth
amendment law centering on privacy rights rather than a matter of
"standing.'"°2
 The petitioners in Rakas advanced a "target standing" theory,
arguing that the fourth amendment should protect any person at whom an
illegal search is directed.'° 3
 The Court rejected this argument.'" The Court's
99 The Alderman Court reasoned that the deterrence policy of the rule would be served by
exclusion in favor of those defendants whose privacy rights had been violated. Id. The Court
continued:
[W]e are not convinced that the additional benefits of extending the exclusionary rule to
other defendants would justify further encroachment upon the public interest in
prosecuting those accused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the basis
of all the evidence which exposes the truth.
Id. at 174-75.
100 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). The Court in Calandra concluded
that illegally seized evidence could be presented to a grand jury. Id. at 35. The decision rested in
part on the traditional powers accorded to that institution. Id. at 349. The Court, however, also
decided that the incremental deterrence from excluding such evidence from a grand jury
proceeding was not sufficient and did not justify its exclusion. Id. at 35-52.
As Calandra demonstrates, this marginal deterrence has allowed the Court to narrow the
application of the exclusionary rule in cases involving issues other than standing. In United States
v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978), the Court held that oral evidence procured following an uncon-
stitutional search can be admitted when the witness demonstrates a willingness to testify
independent of the illegality of the search. Id. at 276-77. Suppression of such evidence where the
witness voluntarily testifies carries little deterrence value, because that witness was likely to come
forward on his or her own. Id.
The marginal deterrence test was also applied by the Court in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465
(1978), to deny a collateral challenge to a search conducted by state law enforcement agencies on a
habeas corpus proceeding in federal court. Id. at 493. The deterrent impact of allowing such col-
lateral challenges was insufficient when the petitioner had had the opportunity to raise the claim in
state court. Id. In United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), the Court refused to suppress
illegally seized evidence in a civil assessment action filed by the IRS where the evidence had
previously been suppressed in a state criminal proceeding. Id. at 437-38. This prior suppression
had already achieved the desired deterrent effect, and any incremental increase that would result
from suppression in the civil assessment action could not justify the social costs of exclusion. Id. at
453-54. The Court distinguished Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), see text and notes
at notes 153-54 infra, on the ground that Elkins involved a subsequent criminal proceeding. United
States v. Janis. 428 U.S. at 458.
10 ' 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
1 " See id. at 138-39. The Rakas opinion was written by Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 129.
Justice Powell's opinion in Payner continued to use the rubric of standing. United States v, Payner,
100 S. Ct. at 2444.
109 The petitioners in Rakas based their target standing theory on the broad dictum of
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 132-33. That
dictum infants defined the victim of a search as "one against whom the search was directed." 363
U.S. at 261. The Jones case is discussed at note 95 supra.
I" Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 133.
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analysis of this area of fourth amendment law, grounded on personal rights 1 °5
and marginal deterrencel" requires a criminal defendant to show an intrusion
into his or her own privacy rights.' 07 Thus the petitioners, who were convicted
on the basis of_ evidence seized from an automobile in which they had been
passengers but in which they claimed no privacy interest,'" were unable to
invoke the exclusionary rule.109
Despite this rejection of target standing in Rakas, Payner did advance the
argument that his fourth amendment rights had been violated by the search of
Wolstencroft's briefcase because he and persons similarly situated, rather than
Wolstencroft, were the genuine targets of the IRS search."° It is difficult to
imagine, however, that Payner had an expectation of privacy in the briefcase."'
Because of this lack of a privacy expectation, the rationale of Rakas clearly
barred him from invoking the fourth amendment or fashioning a successful
"target standing" theory under it. After Rakas a target theory for applying the
exclusionary rule cannot be developed on fourth amendment grounds. Con-
sequently, any hope for vicarious exclusion of illegally seized evidence in cases of
outrageous governmental misconduct must come from another source.
B. Due Process and Outrageous Conduct
Although the fourth amendment is barred as a device for the suppression of
evidence to benefit third parties, the due process clause of the fifth amendment,
with its more general notions of fair play, presents another potential constitu-
tional ground upon which to base the same result. The due process clause was in
fact relied on by the district court in Payner in its decision to exclude the evidence
seized as a result of the search of Wolstencroft's briefcase." 2 Payner also raised
this argument before the Supreme Court."' As applied by the district court, due
105 See id. at 133-134.
D6 See id. at 137.
107
 Id. at 138.
108 Id. at 130-31.
199 Id. at 148. After rejecting the petitioners' target standing argument, the Court con-
sidered whether the Jones concept of "legitimately on the premises," see note 95 supra, extended to
this situation. In rejecting this argument as well, the Court stated that the "legitimately on the
premises" notion would no longer be controlling. Id. at 148. The petitioners' legitimate presence
in the automobile could not alter the result where they lacked a privacy interest in that place. Id.
Justice White dissented, stating that the majority was returning to the proprietary interest
requirement of Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), that had been rejected in Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Rakas, 439 U.S. at 162-63 (White, J., dissenting): Justice
Powell attempted to reassure the dissenters that such was not the case. In his concurrence, he
wrote that the majority had merely focused on requiring a demonstration of a "legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy." 439 U.S. at 150 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
"° Brief for the Respondent at 36-37, United States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. 2439 (1980).
It A depositor does not possess any privacy interest in the records of that deposit main-
tained by a bank or savings institution. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976).
Payner argued that this general rule should not have applied to him because of the secrecy
provisions of the Bahamian banking laws. Brief for the Respondent at 37-38, United States v.
Payner, 100 S. Ct. 2439 (1980). This argument was rejected by the Court. 100 S. Ct. at 2444 n.4.
No mention of this point appears in the dissent.
'" 434 F. Supp. at 133.
"' Brief for the Respondent at 27-34.
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process would require the exclusion of evidence obtained in a manner demon-
strating "bad faith hostility" toward the constitutional rights of any person." 4
The district court found that the misconduct present in Payner amounted to that
type of shocking conduct which the Supreme Court in Rochin v. California" 5 held
incompatible with basic notions of due process." 5 In Rochin, the key evidence
against the defendant consisted of two morphine capsules, which were forcibly
extracted from him by the police's use of a stomach pump."' The Rochin Court
overturned the conviction of the defendant, ruling that the evidence should have
been excluded on due process grounds."' Similarly, the district court in Payner
concluded that the grossly improper fashion by which the Government obtained
the evidence against Payner justified its exclusion under the same provision." 9
In the decade preceding Payner, the Supreme Court had hinted that illegal
government activities could indeed become so outrageous as to allow suppres-
sion of evidence thereby obtained regardless of whether that conduct violated a
right of the defendant.' 2° The district court in Payner decided that the govern-
ment had passed beyond that level of outrageousness in this case and that
suppression was justified under due process despite Payner's lack of standing
under the fourth amendment.' 2 ' Payner argued that the Government's open
admission that its agents had violated the constitutional rights of Wolstencroft
' 14 United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. at 129.
" 5 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
"16 See United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. at 127-29.
1 " 342 U.S. at 166.
18 Id. at 172.
19 434 F. Supp. at 129.
120
 In United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), the respondent was convicted of
manufacturing narcotics. Id. at 424. A primary ingredient had been supplied to Russell by a
government agent. Id. After holding that Russell's predisposition precluded the defense of entrap-
ment, id. at 430-31, the Court went on to consider whether the government's action violated the
standard set forth in Rochin, stating: "While we may someday be presented with a situation in which the
conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government
from invokingjudicial processes to obtain a conviction ... the instant case is distinctly not of that breed."
Id. at 431-32 (emphasis supplied). The Court went on to state that the judiciary may not exercise a
"'chancellor's foot' veto" over convictions of which it does not approve. Id. at 435. The issue
arose again in the factually similar case of Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976). In
Hampton, the defense of entrapment was again precluded by the defendant's predisposition. Id. at
490. In a plurality opinion joined by Chief Justice Berger and Justice White, Justice Rehnquist
stated that the due process clause could not be invoked by a defendant whose rights had not been
violated. Id. (plurality opinion). Justice Powell, joined by Justice Blackmun, concurred in the
judgment, but did not accept the plurality's per se rule on the due process issue, stating: "I do not
understand Russell ... to have gone so far. . . [Russell] did not require the Court to consider
whether overinvolvement of Government agents .. could ever reach such proportions as to bar
conviction of a predisposed defendant as a matter of due process." Id. at 492 (Powell, J.,
concurring) (footnotes omitted). See also United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 676-77 (2d Cir.
1973). There Judge Friendly wrote: "Governmental `investigation' involving participation in
activities that result in injury to the rights of its citizens is a course that courts should be extremely
reluctant to sanction." Id. at 677.
' 2 ' 434 F. Supp. at 133; Note, The Briefcase Caper Standing and Due Process Exclusion: United
States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113 (N.D. Ohio 1977), 10 CONN. L. REV. 210, 220-21 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Due Process Exclusion].
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flaunted that illegality and demonstrated the sort of attitude condemned in
Rochin . 122 To the district court, Wolstencroft's absence as a party made vicarious
exclusion essential to deter such outrageous activities in the future.'" Without
vicarious exclusion, the district court reasoned, the situation would present a
classic scenario "capable of repetition yet evading review.' " 24 The district court
believed that its standard of intentional bad faith created a much higher thresh-
hold than that present under fourth amendment law, where a violation may be
founded upon a technical defect, such as an inadequately executed warrant.' 28
Because due process exclusion, under the district court's standard, could only
occur in cases of intentional bad faith, the court reasoned that this exclusion
need not be limited by any standing restrictions.' 28
The Supreme Court's prior hints that outrageous conduct might permit
suppression of evidence without regard to standing restrictions ostensibly laid a
foundation for the conclusion of the district court that due process would support
exclusion in this case. This due process issue was not properly before the
Supreme Court, since the court of appeals did not pass on the question.' 27 In
Payner, however, the Court retreated from its prior hints, emphasizing that it
considers the argument that due process may require vicarious suppression in
instances of outrageous conduct to be unpersuasive.' 28 Thus, suppression of
evidence obtained through activities of the sort present in Payner must come
under a non-constitutional device. That device is the supervisory power.
125 Brief for Respondent at 33.
1 " See 434 F. Supp. at 129 n.65.
124 Id.
"5 See id. The district court considered the due process threshold in light of the Janis
balancing test. Deterrent effect is low where the government agents act in good faith. Id. Bad faith
activities, however, change the balance in favor of exclusion. Id. This analysis has been charac-
terized as a trade-off between standing and a "subjective" test of the government's misconduct.
Note, Due Process Exclusion, supra note 121, at 219. Instead of focusing on whether the
Government's search violated a privacy right of the defendant, the court focused on the subjective
bad faith intent of the Government agents. Id.
126 434 F. Supp. at 129 n.65. While Payner was before the Sixth Circuit, the Government
contended that Rochin applies only to those situations where the shocking conduct of the govern-
ment involves physical violence. Brief for the United States at 28, United States v. Payner, 590
F.2d 206 (1979). In response, Payner pointed to cases involving exclusion under due process where
there had been no physical violence. See, e.g., Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959); Alcorn,
v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31 (1957); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216 (1942) (perjured testimony);
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 363, 376-77 (1964); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323-24 (1959)
(improperly obtained confessions); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (government's
withholding of favorable evidence). The issues in those classes of cases, however, involve the
reliability of evidence presented or obtained in questionable circumstances. In Payner, as in most
cases involving illegally conducted searches, there was no suggestion that the evidence was
unreliable. See 100 S. Ct. at 2442-43.
127 The court of appeals expressly declined to decide the due process issue. 590 F.2d at
207.
125 So United States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. at 2447 n.9. It is worth noting that Justice
Powell's footnote cites Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976). In Hampton, Justice
Powell had taken issue with a per se rule on due process. Id. at 492-93. See note 120 supra.
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III. THIRD PARTY EXCLUSION UNDER THE
SUPERVISORY POWER
A. The Nature and Application of the Supervisory Power
The supervisory power of the federal courts' 29 is traceable in theory back to
pre-eighteenth century England.' 3° Its present form, however, appears to be a
relatively recent judicial formulation."' The supervisory power exists as a non-
constitutional power of the federal judiciary to insure that the administration of
justice in federal cases, 1 S 2 especially criminal prosecutions, is conducted in a fair
and orderly fashion.'" Because it is non-constitutional in nature, it may be used
to require adherence to standards exceeding minimum constitutional
guarantees.'" Common applications of the power have been to protect the trial
proceeding itself from contamination that would damage the court's integrity.
Such applications have included relaxing procedural requirements,'"
controlling the discretion138
 or excess partisan conduct' 37
 of the trial judge,
protecting the integrity of the jury system, 138 and maintaining controls over
potentially unreliable evidence 1 39 Certain exercises of the supervisory power
have provoked congressional response,"° and it appears that Congress possesses
the authority to define the limits of its application."'
129
 See generally Note, The Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1656
(1963) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Supervisory Power]; Note, The Judge-Made Supervisory Power of
the Federal Courts, 53 GEO. L. J. 1050 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Note, The fudge-Made Power].
13°
 Note, The Judge-Made Power, supra note 129, at 1052-53. A general rule-making power .
over procedural matters was exercised by the King's Court in Westminster long before the
establishment of the American colonies. Id. The commentator writes that the first recognition of
this sort of power by the United States Supreme Court appears in 1792. Id. at 1054 n.27. At that
time, the Court indicated that it would make alterations in its practices and procedures "as
circumstances may render necessary." 2 U.S. (2 Dail.) 414 (1792).
13 ' See Note, The Judge-Made Power, supra note 129, at 1056.
132 The supervisory power is limited to cases in the federal judiciary. See note 216 infra.
'" Note, The fudge-Made Power, supra note 129, at 1050.
134 Id.
1 " Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369, 371-72 (1944) (supplementing the record
with a transcript not technically part of it in order to treat the merits fully); Cf. Helwig v. United
States, 162 F.2d 837, 840 (6th Cir. 1947) (granting of new trial in order to allow the presentment of
evidence that had not been produced at the first proceeding).
"6 Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312-13 (1959) (new trial granted where trial
judge questioned jurors rather than declaring a mistrial after certain inflammatory newspaper
articles had been shown to the jury).
137 Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 17-18 (1954) (new trial granted in response to
biased conduct of trial judge who had displayed personal animosity and lack of proper judicial
restraint in protracted dispute with counsel).
138 Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946); Thiel v. United States, 328 U.S. 217
(1946). The significance of these cases is discussed in text and notes at notes 186-92 infra.
' 39
 Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 14 (1956) (new trial granted after government
came forward with discovery that its key witness might have committed perjury).
140 See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), holding that the defendant was
entitled to inspect certain reports given to the F.B.I. by paid informants in order to impeach the
credibility of the witnesses. Id. at 668-69. Congress responded by codifying the result in the Jencks
Act, 18 U.S.C. 3500 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
' 4 ' See Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 353 n.11 (1959); See also Sibbach v. Wilson
& Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941); Brief for the United States at 18-19, United States v. Payner, 100
S. Ct. 2439 (1980).
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It has been argued that the power must be confined to cases of in-house
judicial self-policing. 142 Nevertheless, from its modern inception in McNabb v.
United States,"' it has been used to counteract improprieties of the executive
branch that do not amount to constitutional violations. In McNabb, the
defendants were arrested for the murder of an IRS agent.' 44 In violation of a
federal statute requiring prompt arraignment,'45 the defendants were held for a
protracted period of time after which confessions were obtained. 146 The Court
excluded these confessions, which were the crux of the Government's case,' 47 on
the basis of the supervisory power.' 48 This decision was not based on fears
surrounding the reliability of the evidence raised by the spectre of involuntary
confessions.'" Rather, the McNabb Court focused on the Government's
misconduct and reasoned that it could not allow itself to be made an accomplice
to such willful disregard of the law .' 5° Thus, by reaching beyond the judicial
sphere to counter improper activity of the executive branch, the McNabb Court
presented a use of the supervisory power different in kind from that defined by
those who would restrict it to judicial self-policing.' 5 '
After McNabb, the supervisory power was applied to suppress tainted
evidence in several other decisions of the Court,'" including Elkins v. United
States.' 53 The power was used in Elkins to eliminate the so-called "silver-platter
doctrine." Under this doctrine federal agents could receive from state
authorities evidence seized by state agents in violation of the fourth amendment.
The evidence would be admissible in federal prosecutions.' 54 Elkins and other
142 Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 182 (1969); See
United States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. at 2447 (Burger, C. J., concurring).
1 " 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
144 Id. at 333.
145 28 Stat. 416 (1896). This requirement is currently contained in FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a).
146 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. at 334-38.
147 Id. at 338.
"a Id. at 340-41.
"9 See Note, The Supervisory Power, supra note 129, at 1660 ("[N]o finding or allegation of
coercion was required, or even relevant." (footnote omitted)); Note, The fudge-Made Power, supra
note 129, at 1062. But see Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 429 (1948) (Reed, J.,
dissenting).
"° McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. at 345. The McNabb Court stated: "Plainly, a
conviction resting on evidence secured through such a flagrant disregard of the procedure which
Congress has commanded cannot be allowed to stand without making the courts themselves
accomplices in willful disobedience of law." Id. It is critical to note, however, that the Court did
not find application of the exclusionary rule to be mandated by the statute. Id. Although it did see
itself as following congressional policy, the choice to exclude was the Court's own. Id. See Note, The
Judge-Made Power, supra note 129, at 1063.
15' See Note, The Supervisory Power, supra note 129, at 1661.
"2 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 452-53, 455 (1957); Mesorosh v. United
States, 352 U.S. 1, 14 (1956); Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 351 U.S.
115, 124-25 (1956); Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 216-17 (1956); Upshaw v. United States,
335 U.S. 410, 414 & n.21 (1948); United States v. Valencia, 541 F.2d 618, 621-22 (6th Cir. 1976).
1 " 364 U.S. 206, 216 (1960).
' 54 Prior to Elkins, such evidence would not have been excluded, since the exclusionary
remedy would not have applied where the federal agents had not participated in the illegal search.
Before Elkins federal agents also could turn over to state authorities material they had seized in
violation of the fourth amendment. Such materials, which would have been inadmissible in federal
court under Weeks, would not have been excluded in state courts. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25 (1949).
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cases suppressing tainted evidence applied the same two policies underlying the
use of the exclusionary rule in other contexts — namely, the deterrence of future
illegality and the preservation of judicial integrity.'" It appears, however, that
cases decided under the supervisory power place greater emphasis on judicial
integrity.'" Nevertheless, the supervisory power is not a judicial wildcard. In
addition to the recognized power of Congress to prescribe the limits of its
application,'" the Court has for some time realized that the power must be used
sparingly, especially in regard to suppressing reliable evidence.'" In spite of the
current emphasis on deterrence as the basic justification for invoking the exclu-
sionary rule ,L 39 judicial integrity has not been altogether absent from the most
recent cases.'" Thus the Court has been unwilling to abandon it as a relevant
factor in search and seizure law.
Nevertheless, the desire of the courts to preserve their integrity does not
automatically justify an independent non-constitutional basis for invoking the
exclusionary rule. Although this use of the supervisory power is historical fact,
two specific objections to it, raised by the Government in Payner, warrant con-
sideration. These objections were not relied on by the Court, but are substantial
enough to deserve attention here. The first is that the doctrine of separation of
powers between the branches of the federal government will not permit the
supervisory power to be used to regulate the activities of the executive branch.' 6 '
This problem is diminished in part by the Court's own recognition that the
power must be used with discretion. 162 Moreover, the nature of the supervisory
power, as exercised in McNabb, is not that of affirmatively intruding into the
affairs of the executive. Rather, the Court was concerned with executive prac-
tices only insofar as they threatened the integrity of a criminal proceeding.' 63
" 5 See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. at 217, 222-23; McNabb v. United States,
318 U,S. 343, 347.
' 56 The Court stated in Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 351 U.S.
115 (1956):
The untainted administration of justice is one of the most cherished aspects of our
institutions. Its observance is one of our proudest boasts. This Court is charged with
supervisory functions in relation to proceedings in the federal courts. See [McNabb).
Therefore, fastidious regard for the honor of the administration of justice requires the
Court to make certain that the doing of justice be made so manifest that only irrational or
perverse claims of its disregard can be asserted.
Id. at 124. This approach was evident in McNabb as well: "The history of liberty has largely been
the history of observance of procedural safeguards. And the effective administration of criminal
justice hardly requires disregard of fair procedures imposed by law." McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. at 347.
" 7 See text and note at note 141 supra.
1 S 5 Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 440 (1963).
"9 See text and notes at notes 82-83 supra.
' 6° See text and note at note 81 supra. See also United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,
431-32 (1973).
' 6 ' See Brief for the United States at 46, Payner, 100 S. Ct. at 2439 (1980).
162 Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 440 (1963). In Lopez the Court suggested that
the use of the supervisory power should be limited to examples of "manifestly improper" govern-
ment conduct, such as a statutory violation. Id. No such misconduct was present in Lopez. Id.
Payner, however, involved conduct which was both unconstitutional and criminal 100 S. Ct. at
2450 (Marshall, J., dissenting).




Thus the exercise of the supervisory power is a refusal of the courts to participate
in the illegalities of the executive branch in an effort to preserve their own
integrity. It is not an attempt by the courts to dictate policy to the executive
branch.
In Payner, the Government's second objection to the use of the supervisory
power as a basis for excluding evidence was that Congress had precluded this
use of the power with the Federal Rules of Evidence.'" The Supreme Court has
recognized that Congress does have the authority to proscribe the limits of the
supervisory power.' 65 The Government thus contended that Rule 402 of the
Federal Rules, promulgated in 1975, is such a limitation prohibiting the
suppression of evidence unless the action at issue is supported by a constitutional
or specific statutory provision.'" The Rule states, in part: 141 relevant
evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution . . . by
Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority." ' 67 The Government in Payner argued
that because the supervisory power does not fall within any of the exceptions, it
could not be used by the district court to exclude evidence.' 65 This argument was
not adopted by the Payner Court, and no mention of it even appears in the
majority opinion. 169
Payner, however, was not the first case in which the Government raised this
argument based on Rule 402. It previously had been asserted and rejected in
United States v. Jacobs.'" In Jacobs, the defendant was indicted for perjury on the
basis of testimony given before a grand jury.'" Contrary to local practice in the
Second Circuit, the defendant was not advised before her appearance that she
was a target of the investigation.' 72 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed the suppression of the defendant's testimony and the
"[Title McNabb Court specifically disclaimed any right to supervise the executive, stating that it
was 'not concerned with law enforcement practices except insofar as courts themselves become
instruments of law enforcement.' " Id. (quoting McNabb, 318 U.S. at 347).
1 € 4 Brief for the United States at 11-12, Payner, 100 S. Ct. 2439 (1980).
'" See Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 353 n.11 (1959). Palermo involved an
interpretation of the Jencks Act, which is discussed at note 140 supra. The Court held that a
memorandum summarizing a three and one-half hour interrogation of the defendant was not a
"statement" within the meaning of the Act and therefore did not have to be given to the
defendant. Id. at 352-53.
166 Brief for the United States at 22-23.
' 67 FED. R. Evin. 402.
"u See Brief for the United States at 24, where the Government argued that the point of
rule 402 "was to wipe the slate clean of judicially-created limitations on the admissibility of
relevant evidence and to insist that in the future all relevant evidence should be admitted, subject
only to those exceptions" which the rule enumerates. Id.
1 " This failure to address the issue may indicate that while the Court does not want to
expand the applications of the exclusionary rule, it also does not want to surrender an inherent
catch-all power, so as not to limit its potential in other contexts. Justice Marshall addressed the
issue in his dissent, where he rejected the Government's argument. United States v. Payner,
100 S. Ct. at 2454 n.17 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
170 547 F.2d 772, 777 (2d Cir. 1976). cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 436 U.S. 31
(1978).
171 Id. at 773.
172 Id. at 773-74.
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dismissal of the indictment for that charge on the basis of the supervisory
power.'" The appeals court stated that the Government "offers no history to
support the view that Congress [in enacting Rule 402] was concerning itself with
the supervisory powers of the federal courts. The obvious purpose of the catchall
clause was to bar common law rules of evidence or state rules of evidence, if in-
consistent."174 Furthermore, while such an effort to eliminate the supervisory
power as a basis for excluding evidence on the part of Congress would appear to
be constitutional," 5 it would be unwise because the Court must bear the
ultimate responsibility for the administration of justice in this country.' 76 There-
fore the courts should be permitted to retain this inherent tool in order to protect
their integrity in cases where constitutional remedies are inadequate.
The majority in Payner did not rely on these two arguments presented by the
Government, being content instead to rule that the power may not be applied to
exclude evidence vicariously. Elkins, McNabb, and other cases have utilized the
supervisory power to exclude improperly obtained evidence"' have, as the
Payner Court indicated, involved violations of legal rights belonging to
defendants who were before the court."8 For example, in McNabb the failure of
the arresting officers to promptly arraign the defendants violated the statutory
rights of those defendants. 178 While the Court in Elkins did indicate that standing
requirements must be met in applying the exclusionary rule,'" it was primarily
concerned with abolishing the "silver-platter doctrine.' 18' Thus, Elkins cannot
be interpreted as passing judgement on the ultimate limits of the supervisory
power. Nevertheless, although neither Elkins nor McNabb supports vicarious
application of the supervisory power, an examination of other instances in which
the power has been exercised reveals that in the proper circumstances it can be
used to exclude illegally obtained evidence to benefit one whose rights were not
violated by the illegal conduct.
B. The Adaptability of the Supervisory Power
To Benefit Third Parties
The supervisory power, which has a well-founded history as a device for
excluding improperly obtained evidence, need not be confined to situations
where the defendant's own rights were violated. Because the supervisory power
is non-constitutional in nature, federal courts may utilize it to create standards
that exceed minimum constitutional levels.'" Hence, the power need not be
doctrinally confined to the vindication of personal rights. Cases involving gov-
I" Id. at 778.
"4 Id. at 777.
'" See Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 353 n.11 (1959); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,
312 U.S. I, 9-10 (1940).
176 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
'" See cases cited at note 152.
1 " United States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. at 2446 n.7.
"9 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. at 345.
1 " Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. at 223 n.16.
'"' Id. at 208. For a discussion of the "silver-platter doctrine," see text and note at note
154 supra.
18 2 See Note, The Judge-Made Power, supra note 129, at 1050.
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ernmental improprieties decided under the supervisory power have used it to
benefit third parties, without requiring them to demonstrate that they were
prejudiced by those improprieties.' 83 Such decisions seek to maintain the
integrity of the administration of justice in the federal courts.'" Thus, the super-
visory power enables federal courts, in proper circumstances, to shift the focus
from the rights of particular litigants and place it upon governmental conduct or
institutions threatening the courts' integrity. 1 "S
For example, in Thiel v. Southern Pacc Co. , 1116 the Court reversed a civil jury
verdict on the ground that wage earners had been excluded from the jury pool,
contrary to the applicable federal law.'" Similarly, in Ballard v. United States ,' 8 B
criminal convictions were overturned where women had been excluded from
jury service.'" In neither case were the parties required to demonstrate that they
had been prejudiced by these improprieties in the jury selection procedures.' 9°
Instead, the Court looked to the integrity of the jury system, stating in Thiel:
[W]e cannot sanction the method by which the jury panel was formed
in this case. . . . That conclusion requires us to reverse the judgment
below in the exercise of our power of supervision over the administra-
tion of justice in the federal courts. See [McNabb]. On that basis it be-
comes unnecessary to determine whether the petitioner was in any
way prejudiced by the wrongful exclusion. . . .' 91
The Court expressed similar sentiments in Ballard: "The injury is not limited to
the defendant — there is injury to the jury system, to the law as an institution, to
the community at large, and to the democratic ideal reflected in the processes of
our courts." 292
A more recent example of this vicarious use of the supervisory power is
presented in the Sixth Circuit decision of United States v. Valencia.'" In Valencia, a
person who was a paid government informant and a secretary for the attorney of
one of the defendants passed confidential information and memoranda to gov-
1 " See Note, The Supervisory Power, supra note 129, at 1657:
"[S]upervision" [under the power) has been effectuated in a manner representing a
distinct departure from traditional appellate review of lower federal court process. As
exercised, the supervisory power attenuates the distinction between "prejudicial" and
"harmless" error. So long as the "error" violates the Court's standard for conducting
judicial proceedings, reversal will usually follow even though the effect on the particular
litigant may have been inconsequential or non-existent.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
184 Id.
1" Id. The commentator writes: "[T]he reviewing court may, under the supervisory
power, shift its focus from the adjudication of the parties' rights to a more general investigation of
judicial procedures, effecting a more comprehensive kind of supervision than had seemed possible
under earlier doctrines." Id.
les 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
1 " Id. at 225.
188 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
168 Id. at 192-93.
19° Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. at 225; Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. at
195.
191 328 U.S. at 225.
192 329 U.S. at 195.
199 541 F.2d 618 (6th Cir. 1976).
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ernment investigators.'" She also offered testimony regarding the criminal con-
spiracy for which the defendants were indicted.'" These activities involved
violations of the attorney-client privilege, and the Sixth Circuit held that any
evidence which was the product of such grossly improper conduct must be
excluded under the supervisory power from being used against any of the
defendants.' 96
 This ruling was extended to benefit two of the defendants who
were not parties to the privilege. The court ruled that "under our supervisory
authority over the conduct of federal prosecutions . . . they are entitled to the
same relief." 97
 Although the Valencia court was outraged by the conspiracy, it
refused to permit the law to be "equally slimy" by obtaining convictions
through outrageous conduct on its own behalf.'" Thus Valencia demonstrates a
use of the supervisory power to maintain the integrity of the judicial process,
rather than merely determining the rights and duties of the particular parties to
the litigation.
It should be noted that the conduct of the Government in Payner was even
more outrageous than that resulting in vicarious exclusion in Valencia. Valencia,
as opposed to Payner, did not involve outright violations of criminal statutes and
constitutional rights. Yet the Court's opinion in Payner did not address the Sixth
Circuit's application of the supervisory power in Valencia. Based upon the deci-
sion in Valencia, as well as Thiel and Ballard, it is submitted that evidence may be
properly suppressed to benefit a third person in cases of grossly improper gov-
ernment misconduct, and that the district court in Payner was correct in sup-
pressing the evidence so obtained by the illegal search of Wolstencroft's brief-
case. The admission of this evidence due to the ultimate reversal by the Supreme
Court poses questions about the Court's desire to sustain the integrity of the
administration of justice in the federal courts.
C . The Fallout of Payner
After the Supreme Court's decision in Payner, no future defendant will be
able to vindicate the unconstitutional intrusions perpetrated in the "briefcase
caper." 199 Yet, as the district court recognized, the "briefcase caper" is a classic
example of an abuse "capable of repetition, yet evading review," a traditional
justification for relaxing standing requirements. 2" Moreover, while the Court's
194 Id. at 620-21.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 622-23. The case was remanded to determine whether the defendants had been
convicted on the basis of the tainted evidence. Id. at 624.
19?
 Id. at 621-22.
In Id. at 621 (quoting the trial court (unreported opinion)).
199 The alternative remedy of a civil cause of action against the government by the person
whose rights were invaded by the illegal search was created by the Court in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971). Yet it is highly unlikely that
Wolstencroft will return to this country to file such an action.
24° See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973) (end of pregnancy not permitted to
moot woman's constitutional challenge to Texas abortion statute); United States v. W. T. Grant
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ruling may have limited the ability of judges to exclude evidence obtained by the
methods present in Payner, it has not limited their desire to do so. 20 ' The conflict
presented to such judges is illustrated by the subsequent case of United States a.
Cortina, 202 which purports to follow Payner in its application of the supervisory
power.
In Cortina, a federal agent lied to a United States magistrate in order to
obtain a warrant to search two premises suspected of harboring gambling opera-
tions . 2°3 Evidence seized in the search was suppressed in favor of several
defendants who lacked fourth amendment standing to challenge the search. 204
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed on the
basis of the supervisory power despite the absence of a constitutional violation as
to these defendants . 2°5 The appeals court interpreted Payner as authorizing sup-
pression when there has been fraud upon the court in conjunction with the
violation of other, non-constitutional rights of the defendant. 206 The Cortina
court found that such violations had occurred, stating: "the evidence was seized
from the defendants in violation of their own rights, and was seized only by de-
frauding the court. . . ." 2°7 Yet, the court did not indicate clearly the nature of
the defendants' rights or how they had been violated. 208 The Seventh Circuit's
decision in Cortina thus oversteps the logic of Payner which seeks to limit exclusion
under the power to situations where the defendant's rights are plainly
violated. 209 This analytical side-stepping of Payner by the Seventh Circuit in
Cortina demonstrates the need to expand the contours of the supervisory power
to allow federal judges to combat grossly improper governmental conduct that
threatens the integrity of the federal justice administration. The final task of this
casenote is to propose a standard for such an expansion.
Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1953) (director's resignations from three corporate boards not
permitted to moot Clayton Act action for interlocking directorates); Southern Pac. Terminal Co.
v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911) (expiration of ICC order did not moot action to enjoin enforce-
ment of the order).
201 The Court stated in Payner: "We certainly can understand the District Court's com-
mendable desire to deter deliberate intrusions into the privacy of persons who are unlikely to
become defendants in a criminal prosecution. No court should condone the unconstitutional and
possibly criminal behavior of those who planned and executed this 'briefcase caper'." United
States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. at 2445 (citation and footnote omitted).
202 630 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir. 1980).
203 Id. at 1208.
1" Id. at 1213.
205 Id. at 1214.
206 Id. at 1216.
207 Id. (emphasis added).
208 The court of appeals apparently relied on Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), in
concluding that the defendants' own rights were violated. See United States v. Cortina, 630 F.2d at
1214. In Franks, the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant whose own apartment had been
searched under a facially valid warrant could challenge the veracity of the warrant by demon-
strating that it was based upon intentional or flagrantly reckless misrepresentations. 438 U.S. at
171-72. The Seventh Circuit cited no authority for extending the Franks rule to defendants who
lacked a privacy interest in the area that was searched.
209 United States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. at 2444, 2446.
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IV. A STANDARD FOR THIRD PARTY EXCLUSION
UNDER THE SUPERVISORY POWER
In the Payner opinion, the Supreme Court stated that the district court's
application of the power was standardless."° Despite the Sixth Circuit's failure
to enunciate a standard for the power's application in excluding evidence, it is
clear that the district court had attempted to articulate when such application
would be proper."' Using the district court's notions as a foundation, it is
possible to define when evidence may properly be excluded on the motion of a
defendant who was not the victim of the search and who lacks standing to
challenge the search under the fourth amendment.
It is submitted that evidence may be excluded when the defendant can show
a preconceived plan to conduct a search which knowingly and wilfully violates
the constitutional or statutory rights of others and which is intended primarily to
gather evidence, or information likely to produce evidence, for use against the
defendant, or a class of persons in which the defendant is a member. This plan
must be pre-arranged and approved prior to the point in time at which the
sequence of events directly culminating in the illegal conduct began to occur. 212
Further, the government agents executing the plan must act in bad faith, fully
cognizant that their conduct is illega1. 213
 A major purpose of the search must be
to obtain evidence against someone other than the person whose own rights are
violated by the search. 2 ' 4
 The defendant must be a member of a recognizable
group against which the government sought the information. 215
 This use of the
supervisory power would be limited to cases in the federal courts. 216
Most of the Supreme Court's recent fourth amendment standing decisions
would not be affected by such a rule. For instance, the proposed rule would not
alter the result in Rakas, where the illegality did not approach the sort of pre-
conceived plan present in Payner. The police officers in Rakas stopped the car in
which the defendants were riding after receiving a report of a robbery and a
description of the getaway car. 217
 The sequence of events which culminated in
the illegal search had therefore begun without any intent to take advantage of
Fourth Amendment standing restrictions, and the requisite pre-arrangement
210 Id. at 2445, 2447. Similarly, the Government argued that the Sixth Circuit's
affirmance of the district court's order provided no standard for applying the exclusionary rule
under the supervisory power. Brief for the United States at 13-14.
2"
 See United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. at 134-35.
212
 In Payner, Casper had formulated the plan to search Wolstencroft's briefcase, and had
obtained the approval to implement the plan prior to the actual seizure of the briefcase. See 100 S.
Ct. at 2443.
213 Cf. United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. at 130, 133, 134-35 (the district court's
notion of "bad faith hostility").
214
	 United States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. at 2448 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
215 See id.
216
 Principles of federalism require that state courts determine their own response to any
instances of such conduct by their own state's law enforcement agents in procuring evidence for
state criminal proceedings. The federal courts' supervisory power can only operate properly
within the sphere of the federal judiciary. For a discussion of the relation of the federal courts'
supervisory power to state court proceedings, see Note, The Supers sort' Power, supra note 129, at
1664-66; Note, The Judge-Made Power, supra note 129, at 1071-74.
2 ' 7 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 130.
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was not present. 218 In Alderman v. United States , 2 '9 however, another major
decision of the Court which tightened the restrictions on fourth amendment
standing, application of this standard may have altered the holding. The
Alderman Court ruled that evidence obtained through illegal wiretaps would not
be excluded in favor of those defendants whose own fourth amendment rights
were not violated . 22° If the government's misconduct in Alderman amounted to
the type of preconceived plan present in Payner, then under the proposed
standard the evidence would have been excluded to benefit all of the defendants.
The facts of Payner fall squarely within this proposed standard. Casper's plan
was approved by the IRS prior to Wolstencroft's visit to Miami in January
1973.221 Moreover, the district court's findings establish the bad faith of those
who conducted the search. 222 Lastly, the search was aimed at obtaining the
names of persons maintaining accounts at the Castle Bank, rather than at
Wolstencroft. 2" Payner, unfortunately, was a member of this class.
Under the rule suggested here, a person who claims to have been
prosecuted as a result of such outrageous conduct would have the burden of
establishing that the elements of the proposed standard had been met. This pro-
cedural burden could best be achieved through a device comparable to that
established by the Supreme Court in Franks v. Delaware. 224 In Franks, the Court
permitted a defendant to challenge the veracity of a facially valid warrant. 225
The Franks defendant was required to make an offer of proof sufficient to demon-
strate that specific sections of the affadavit, drawn up to establish probable cause
for the issuance of the warrant, were either deliberate falsehoods or the product
of a reckless disregard for the truth. 226 The Franks defendant also had to show
that, aside from these misrepresentations, no independent grounds existed for
establishing probable cause. 227 According to the Franks Court, if the offer of
proof is sufficient, the trial court should grant a hearing on the defendant's
allegations . 228 Similar procedural requirements could be developed to
implement the standard proposed here. Specifically, the movant should be
required to make averments of the specific illegalities involved, and, through a
proper offer of proof, demonstrate that such activities in fact occurred and were
conducted by the federal government or agents of it. If the defendant meets this
burden, a Franks-type hearing could be held to determine whether these allega-
tions are true and whether the proposed evidence was in fact obtained as a result
of the illegal conduct. 229 If the truth of the defendant's allegations is established
218 Of course, Rakas involved violations by state police, and hence would not come under
the federal courts' supervisory power.
219 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
229 Id. at 171-72.
2" 100 S. Ct. at 2443.
222 434 F. Supp. at 130, 133, 134-35.
225 See United States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. at 2448 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
224 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
225 Id. at 171-72.
226 Id. at 171.
227 Id. at 172.
278 Id.
229 The evidence offered at trial must have been obtained as a result of the search in order
for suppression to occur. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
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• at the hearing, then all the fruits of the governmental misconduct should be
suppressed.
The adoption of such a standard would permit the Federal courts to exclude
evidence to benefit a third party only in cases of extreme misconduct, thus
allaying the Payner Court's fears of standardless discretion. Nor would the Payner
Court's fear that application of the exclusionary rule under the supervisory
power would upset the balance between the interests of deterrence and the
societal harm suffered by invoking the rule be justified under this standard. 23 °
For it is clear that in no other situation would deterrence be more effective than
against the sort of misconduct present in Payner. Payner was by no means an
example of law enforcement officers becoming confused by complex
circumstances or unclear signals from the courts. The misconduct present in this
case was blatant and premeditated. It involved an explicit understanding on the
part of those who planned the search that the proposed actions were illegal."'
Exclusion in those circumstances could not possibly send a more definite signal
to the Federal government that evidence obtained by such methods would be
inadmissible in a court of law. 232
 Similarly, the policy of judicial integrity could
not have been served better than by exclusion in Payner. The government knew
that the persons who ultimately would be prosecuted as a result of the "briefcase
caper" would lack fourth amendment standing to challenge the search. 233 The
type of conduct exhibited by the government here breeds the contempt for law
that so outraged Justice Brandeis in his Olmstead dissent. 234
 The Supreme
Court's refusal in Payner to exclude the evidence obtained as a result of the
search of Wolstencroft's briefcase strikes a blow at the integrity of the
administration of justice in this country. Adoption of the proposed standards
would prevent this harm while promoting the two-fold policy of the exclusionary
rule in a reasoned manner.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's holding in Payner restricts use of the supervisory
power as a device for excluding illegally obtained evidence to situations where
the defendant's own rights are violated. The decision reaffirms the Court's
recent emphasis upon deterrence as the principal justification for the exclusion-
ary rule. It does so, however, at the expense of the judicial integrity rationale.
This rationale lies at the heart of both the Court's earlier supervisory power
decisions, and, indeed, the origins of the exclusionary rule itself. The Payner
holding effectively superimposes fourth amendment standing restrictions onto
the supervisory power in the search and seizure area. In doing so, it limits the
use of the supervisory power as a remedy for the sort of outrageous activities
present in Payner.
Whatever the proper contours of fourth amendment standing may be, it
"° United States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. at 2445.
23'
	 States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. at 120-21.
232 Cf. id, at 129 n.65 (the district court's discussion of the deterrent effect of its ruling).
233 Id. at 131.
234
 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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must not be used to shelter such outrageously lawless conduct by those charged
with the law's enforcement. The Supreme Court should re-evaluate its decision
in Payner in order to deter such misconduct in the future and to maintain the
integrity of the federal courts. The standard proposed by this casenote for
applying the exclusionary rule under the federal courts supervisory power is a
basis for such an alteration. The Court's failure to so act would allow such
abuses to continue to taint the integrity of those courts. A nation pledged to obey
the rule of law cannot ignore such threats to its basic order. 235
KEVIN MICHAEL CAROME
235 Recall Justice Brandeis' remarks in Olmstead:
Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for
the law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.
Id.
